DWI Cases and the Plain View Exception to the Warrant Requirement

In a drinking and driving prosecution, almost all evidence discovered during a lawful, warrantless search of a motor vehicle is legally admissible against the defendant under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The plain view doctrine was established by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The original plain view exception required proof of three elements: 1) the police officer had to be lawfully in the viewing area. Basically, the officer must have a legal right to be in the place from which he or she makes the observations. 2) the officer was required to discover the evidence inadvertently, meaning that the officer did not know where the evidence was in advance. 3) the criminal nature of the item must be immediately apparent.

The original test has been modified by the United States Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. In Texas v. Brown, the immediately apparent requirement was modified as the police must have probable cause to associate the item seen in plain view with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). In 1990, the Court again modifed the test as the inadvertent aspect of the discovery of evidence was not a necessary condition. Basically, they did away with the second prong of the test.

As modified, the New Jersey Supreme Court has accepted the three requirements governing the plain view exception as described in Brown. As modified, the plain view exception in New Jersey will require proof that:

1) at the time of the viewing of the evidence, the officer was in a location where he or she had a right to be.

2) the officer discovered the evidence inadvertently, meaning that he or she did not know in advance where the evidence was located and did not intend beforehand to seize it; and

3) there was probable cause to associate the items seen in plain view with the evidence of criminal activity.

Interestingly enough, New Jersey has yet to drop the inadvertent requirement from plain view analysis as was done by the United States Supreme Court in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

Length of detention following a traffic stop

During a routine traffic stop, an officer needs a certain amount of time to perform his duties. He must first be satisfied that the driver and occupants do not constitute a threat to themselves or others. Then the officer must obtain information and driving credentials from the driver, verify that neither the vehicle nor its occupants is wanted by other police agencies and complete any tickets and any other documents associated with the stop. Obviously, all of this takes time.

Time is a critical factor during a traffic stop. Although the driver is not under arrest, he or she has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is not free to leave. The defendant is being detained for investigation purposes. Accordingly, the officer does not need probable cause to believe that the operator has committed an offense, nor must the officer inform the driver of his or her constitutional rights prior to questioning. However, the longer the detention period continues, the more the motor vehicle stop will take on the characteristics of an arrest as opposed to a detention. As a result, a court may consider a prolonged detention to have developed into a de facto arrest that must be supported by probable cause. Evidence seized from the operator or statements made during the course of a de facto arrest that is unsupported by probable cause are subject to suppression.

In general, a traffic stop will be considered reasonable if it lasts no longer than is necessary to effectuate its purpose.

Justification for motor vehicle stops

It is well settled that the stopping of a motor vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the detention is brief. The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), held that the police must have at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a violation of the traffic laws has occurred. This may include a reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed, the vehicle is not properly registered, or that an occupant in the vehicle is subject to seizure for a violation of the law. Absent a reasonable and articulable suspicion, individual police officers may not use their unbridled discretion to effect motor vehicle stops. The Prouse case involved a random stop by a police officer to check on a driver's credentials. There was no justification for the stop other than a desire to perform a random check. Although the Supreme Court ruled that the random aspect of the stop was unreasonable, it did not rule out other types of spot checks by the police. One such suggested stop would be a supervised road block where all vehicles would be stopped and questioned about driving credentials. However, the court was clear that individual officers could not effect motor vehicle stops in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion.

Basics of DWI Stops

There are several important issues that can be raised that are unrelated to the level of intoxication of the defendant. The first involves the legal justification for the motor vehicle stop. Both the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution ban one type of search and seizure, one that is unreasonable. Searches and seizures that are undertaken without the authority of a judicially issued warrant are presumed to be invalid and thus unreasonable under both the State and federal constitutions. Therefore, in every drunk driving case it is the State's responsibility to demonstrate that the police seizure of the defendant's motor vehicle by way of a motor vehicle stop and any subsequent search of the defendant or the vehicle were reasonable. The physical evidence recovered from the search of a motor vehicle, such as drugs or beer cans, may constitute powerful direct or circumstantial evidence of guilt. The justification for the motor vehicle stop must be based on reasonable suspicion. If it is not, it may result in the suppression of all the prosecution's evidence. After the determination that the stop is supported by reasonable suspicion, the arrest for drinking and driving must be based on probable cause. This is a warrantless arrest by a police officer which is allowed under the New Jersey drinking and driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. In essence, the probable cause determination is based on the totality of the circumstances presented to the officer and need only be objectively reasonable to be legally sustainable. When the arrest of a suspect for drinking and driving is found to be unreasonable because it was not based on probable cause, all evidence stemming from the arrest, including physical evidence seized incident to the arrest and the results of breath or blood tests may be subject to suppression. This is all based on the Fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure.